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ARTICLES
Bad Law or Just Bad Timing?:
Post-pandemic Implications of Managed
Care Advisory Group, LLC v. CIGNA
Healthcare, Inc.’s Ban on the Use of
Virtual Technology for Taking Non-party
Evidence Under Section 7 of the Federal
Arbitration Act
LATOYA C. BROWN*
The COVID-19 pandemic has had an enormous socioeconomic impact globally. To continue operations, the legal field, like other sectors, has had to adapt to the exigencies of the pandemic by, inter alia, becoming increasingly
reliant on remote technologies to conduct business. Yet, only a few months before COVID-19 was declared a pandemic, the Eleventh Circuit ruled in Managed Care Advisory
Group, LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d 1145
(11th Cir. 2019), that Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration
Act (the “FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 7, prohibits prehearing discovery and does not allow a summonsed witness to appear
*
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the views of the Department of Justice. Ms. Brown would like to thank her colleagues and research collaborators for their support and contribution to this project.
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in locations outside the physical presence of the arbitrator
and, thus, an arbitral summons for a witness to appear via
video conference is not enforceable. Intellectually, Managed Care raises interesting issues concerning the textualist
approach to statutory construction. For practical purposes,
the opinion stands at odds with the realities of arbitration
in the modern world, where remote technology has played
a key role in the efficient administration of arbitration proceedings. Further, in light of the pandemic and its related
health risks, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion raises concerns
about the conduct of arbitration proceedings, particularly
when disclosure of information by non-parties is needed for
a full and fair hearing. After examining the text of Section 7
and federal circuit courts’ opinions interpreting the provision, this Article proposes an alternate, perhaps timelier,
textual interpretation of Section 7—one that remains true to
the text, comports with the practicalities of modern arbitration, and anticipates challenges that will continue or arise
in a post-pandemic world.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 18, 2019, six months before the World Health
Organization declared COVID-19 a global pandemic,1 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided Managed
Care Advisory Group, LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc.2 During
this time, legal communities were becoming increasingly reliant on
remote technologies such as Zoom Video Communications, Inc.3
In Managed Care, the Eleventh Circuit held, among other things,
that the words “attend,” “attendance,” and “before” contained in
Section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”), do “not authorize district courts to compel witnesses to appear in locations
1

See Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, WHO Director-General’s opening
remarks at the media briefing on COVID-19 – 11 March 2020 (Mar. 11, 2020)
(transcript available at https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/
who-director-general-s-opening-remarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19--11-march-2020) (“We have therefore made the assessment that COVID-19 can
be characterized as a pandemic.”). COVID-19 is caused by infection with a new
coronavirus called severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2, or SARSCoV-2. Symptoms of COVID-19, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/symptoms-testing/symptoms.html
(last updated Feb. 22, 2021). Compared to the flu, COVID-19 seems to spread
more easily and causes more serious illnesses in some people. Id.
2
Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d
1145, 1151 (11th Cir. 2019).
3
Matt Torman, Zoom Court Is Now in Session: How the Legal World Has
Pivoted to Virtual During COVID-19, ZOOM BLOG (July 23, 2020),
https://blog.zoom.us/zoom-virtual-law-firm-virtual-courtroom-during-covid-19/.
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outside the physical presence of the arbitrator, so the court may not
enforce an arbitral summons for a witness to appear via video conference.”4 The Eleventh Circuit reached its conclusion by applying
a textual approach to statutory construction, for which it relied in
part on “dictionaries” published around the time the FAA was enacted––in 1925.5
With Managed Care, the Eleventh Circuit became the first, and
thus far only, federal circuit to limit the use of video technology in
connection with arbitrators’ power to summons non-party witnesses and document production under Section 7 of the FAA.6 While
other federal circuit courts had previously addressed and, by majority, limited pre-hearing discovery under Section 7 as it relates to
nonparties to the arbitration proceedings,7 none had considered the
role of remote technologies under Section 7.
This Article begins by examining the text of Section 7 and how
federal circuit courts’ opinions issued prior to Managed Care interpreted the language used in that provision. The Article then considers the specific holding of the Eleventh Circuit in Managed
Care. Then, the Article proposes an alternative, perhaps timelier,
textual approach to Section 7, and how that alternative approach
comports with standards in the field of arbitration. Finally, the Article examines the implication of Managed Care for arbitrations
conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic and in a post-pandemic
environment.
I.
SECTION 7 OF THE FAA
The FAA was enacted in 1925 and then reenacted and codified
in 1947 as Title 9 of the United States Code.8 “It has not been
amended since the enactment of Title VII in 1964.”9 The FAA was
enacted “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration
agreements that had existed at English common law and had been
4
5
6
7
8
9

Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1151.
Id. at 1160.
Id.
See discussion infra Part II.
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288 (2002).
Id. at 288–89.
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adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements
upon the same footing as other contracts.”10 Arbitration is a creature of contract.11 Thus, the arbitrator’s power over the parties to
the arbitration proceedings is limited by the contours of the parties’
agreement.12 In like manner, the only power an arbitrator has over
non-parties––who have not bargained to submit to arbitration––is
the authority granted by the FAA.13
Regarding arbitrators’ subpoena powers, Section 7 of the FAA
provides:
The arbitrators selected either as prescribed in this
title or otherwise, or a majority of them, may summon in writing any person to attend before them or
any of them as a witness and in a proper case to
bring with him or them any book, record, document,
or paper which may be deemed material as evidence
in the case . . . . [I]f any person or persons so summoned to testify shall refuse or neglect to obey said
summons, upon petition the United States district
court for the district in which such arbitrators, or a
majority of them, are sitting may compel the attendance of such person or persons before said arbitrator or arbitrators, or punish said person or persons
for contempt in the same manner provided by law
for securing the attendance of witnesses or their
punishment for neglect or refusal to attend in the
courts of the United States.14
This provision gives arbitrators two powers that are relevant here:
“First, arbitrators may compel the attendance of a person ‘to attend

10

Id. at 289 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U. S. 20,
24 (1991)).
11
See Louis Dreyfus Negoce S.A. v. Blystad Shipping & Trading Inc., 252
F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 2001).
12
See id.
13
Kennedy v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., Inc., 646 F. Supp. 2d
1342, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2009).
14
9 U.S.C. § 7 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
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before them . . . as a witness,’ and second, arbitrators may compel
such person ‘to bring with him or them’ relevant documents.”15
Since an arbitrator’s power over parties to an arbitration proceeding stems from the arbitration agreement, notwithstanding limitations in Section 7, where the agreement so provides, the arbitrator may more broadly compel discovery from the parties.16 Federal
courts are split, however, on whether Section 7 authorizes arbitrators to compel pre-hearing document discovery from entities or
persons not parties to the arbitration proceeding.17 Some courts
have concluded that Section 7 restricts an arbitrator’s subpoena
power to situations in which the non-party has been called to appear in the “physical” presence of the arbitrator and to hand over
the documents at that time.18 This Article proceeds to take a brief
look at these decisions.
FEDERAL CIRCUITS INTERPRETING SECTION 7 PRIOR TO
MANAGED CARE
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Managed Care was issued
against a backdrop of opinions by the Fourth,19 Sixth,20 Eighth,21
Third,22 Second,23 and Ninth24 Circuits addressing the scope of
arbitrators’ powers under Section 7 to compel a person “to attend
before them . . . as a witness” and “to bring with him or them” relevant documents.25 The outcome of Managed Care was at least
II.

15

CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2017).
Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d
210, 217 (2d Cir. 2008); see also CVS Health, 878 F.3d at 708.
17
See discussion infra Part II.
18
See Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d
Cir. 2004); Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939
F.3d 1145, 1160–61 (11th Cir. 2019).
19
COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir. 1999).
20
Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004,
1004 (6th Cir. 1999).
21
In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 868 (8th Cir. 2000).
22
Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 405, 407.
23
Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d
210, 214 (2d Cir. 2008).
24
CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 2017).
25
Id.
16

2021]

BAD LAW OR JUST BAD TIMING?

1043

partly shaped by this preexisting legal landscape.26 Therefore, it is
important to take a brief look at the factual context of the federal
circuits’ prior opinions and the reasoning behind those decisions.
A.
Fourth Circuit
In COMSAT Corporation v. National Science Foundation, the
Fourth Circuit decided an appeal brought by the National Science
Foundation (the “NSF”) from an order requiring the agency to
comply with subpoenas issued by an arbitrator during prehearing
discovery.27 The subpoenas demanded that the agency, which was
not a party to the arbitration agreement at issue, produce documents and employee testimony related to a construction contract
between appellee, COMSAT, Inc., and an NSF awardee.28 The
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held instead that the FAA does not authorize an arbitrator to subpoena
third parties during prehearing discovery, absent a showing of special need or hardship.29
The Fourth Circuit stated that “[b]y its own terms, the FAA’s
subpoena authority is defined as the power of the arbitration panel
to compel non-parties to appear ‘before them;’ that is, to compel
testimony by non-parties at the arbitration hearing.”30 The FAA
does not “grant an arbitrator the authority to order non-parties to
appear at depositions, or the authority to demand that non-parties
provide the litigating parties with documents during prehearing
discovery.”31 The court also rejected the proposition that an arbitrator’s power was coextensive with that of a federal district court
so as to allow “full-blown discovery.”32 The rationale for doing so,
the court reasoned, is that “[p]arties to a private arbitration agreement forego certain procedural rights attendant to formal litigation
26

See Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939
F.3d 1145, 1151 (11th Cir. 2019).
27
COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 271 (4th Cir. 1999).
28
Id.
29
Id. at 271, 278. The appellate court also analyzed the issues raised by the
appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
30
Id. at 275.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 276.
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in return for a more efficient and cost-effective resolution of their
disputes.”33 The Fourth Circuit stated, however, that “under unusual circumstances,” and upon making the requisite showing, a party
may “petition the district court to compel pre-arbitration discovery
upon a showing of special need or hardship.”34
B.
Sixth Circuit
A few months prior to the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
COMSAT, the Sixth Circuit briefly addressed Section 7, in dicta, in
American Federation of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV.35
That case involved a labor dispute implicating section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act.36 The appellant filed an action
in federal court seeking to enforce a subpoena duces tecum issued
by the arbitrator to a nonparty to the underlying arbitration.37 The
Sixth Circuit ultimately agreed with the appellant that the district
court had authority to enforce the arbitrator’s subpoena under section 301 and looked to Section 7 of the FAA for guidance in reaching its decision.38
Specifically, examining Section 7, the Sixth Circuit noted that:
Just as the subpoena power of an arbitrator under
the FAA extends to non-parties, a labor arbitrator
conducting an arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement should also have the power to subpoena third parties. See Wilkes-Barre, 559 F. Supp.
at 880 (“a decision to enforce an arbitrator’s subpoena will promote the goals of labor policy if it
will foster the effective operation of arbitration machinery”). In addition, the FAA’s provision authorizing an arbitrator to compel the production of documents from third parties for purposes of an arbitra33

Id.
Id.
35
Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV 164 F.3d 1004,
1004 (6th Cir. 1999).
36
Id. at 1006–07.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 1008–09.
34
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tion hearing has been held to implicitly include the
authority to compel the production of documents for
inspection by a party prior to the hearing.39
Accordingly, the court concluded that “a labor arbitrator is authorized to issue a subpoena duces tecum to compel a third party to
produce records he deems material to the case either before or at an
arbitration hearing.”40
C.
Eighth Circuit
In re Security Life Insurance Co. of America arose from an underlying arbitration brought by a health insurer to determine its
compliance with a reinsurance contract it had in place with
Transamerica Occidental Life Insurance Company (“Transamerica”) and other insurers.41 The arbitration panel issued a subpoena
to Transamerica “to produce documents and to provide the testimony of a certain employee.”42 However, Transamerica “refused
to respond to the subpoena, contending that it was not a party to
the arbitration” and, thus, the arbitration panel had no authority to
issue the subpoena under the FAA.43 The Eight Circuit disagreed.44
While the Eight Circuit recognized that Section 7 does not “explicitly authorize the arbitration panel to require the production of
documents for inspection by a party” and that “the efficient resolution of disputes through arbitration necessarily entails a limited
discovery process,” it found that “efficiency is furthered by permitting a party to review and digest relevant documentary evidence
prior to the arbitration hearing.”45 Therefore, the court held that
“implicit in an arbitration panel’s power to subpoena relevant documents for production at a hearing is the power to order the production of relevant documents for review by a party prior to the

39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 1009.
Id.
In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 867 (2000).
Id. at 867–68.
Id. at 868.
Id. at 870–71.
Id. at 870.
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hearing.”46 And the arbitration panel could exercise its power even
if Transamerica was not a party to the arbitration.47
Thus, the Eighth Circuit apparently took a policy approach, as
opposed to a textual approach, to hold that Section 7 authorizes
arbitrators to issue prehearing document-production subpoenas on
non-parties.48 To date, it is the only circuit to reach this conclusion,
short of the Sixth Circuit’s similar conclusion, in dicta, in American Federation.49
D.
Third Circuit
In Hay Group, Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., an employer
commenced an arbitration proceeding against its former employee,
alleging that the employee violated a non-solicitation clause in his
separation agreement.50 To obtain information for the arbitration,
the employer served subpoenas for documents on the employee’s
new employers, PwC and its division, E.B.S.51 PwC and E.B.S.
objected to the subpoenas, leading the employer to move for enforcement in federal district court.52 Among other things, PwC and
E.B.S. argued that the FAA “did not authorize the arbitration panel
to issue subpoenas to non-parties for prehearing document production.”53
Accepting the view of the Eighth Circuit and other district
courts, the district court held “that the FAA authorizes arbitration
panels to issue subpoenas to non-parties for prehearing document
production.”54 The district court found “that even under the view
of the Fourth Circuit, which permits production only when there is

46

Id. at 870–71.
Id. at 871.
48
Id. at 870–71.
49
Am. Fed’n of Television & Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004,
1009 (6th Cir. 1999).
50
Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 405 (3d Cir.
2004).
51
Id.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 406.
54
Id.
47
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a ‘special need,’ the panel’s subpoenas would be valid.”55 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the decision of the district court.56
Then-Judge Alito, writing the opinion of the appellate court,
began with certain principles of statutory construction, noting “that
recourse to legislative history or underlying legislative intent is
unnecessary when a statute’s text is clear and does not lead to an
absurd result” and “a court’s policy preferences cannot override
the clear meaning of a statute’s text.”57 Looking at the “unambiguous” language of Section 7, the Third Circuit found that:
[t]he power to require a non-party “to bring” items
“with him” clearly applies only to situations in
which the non-party accompanies the items to the
arbitration proceeding, not to situations in which the
items are simply sent or brought by a courier. In addition, the use of the word “and” makes it clear that
a non-party may be compelled “to bring” items
“with him” only when the non-party is summoned
“to attend before [the arbitrator] as a witness.”
Thus, Section 7’s language unambiguously restricts
an arbitrator’s subpoena power to situations in
which the non-party has been called to appear in the
physical presence of the arbitrator and to hand over
the documents at that time.58
For support, and to show that the result of its analysis is not absurd, the court pointed to similarities in the language used in Section 7 of the FAA and in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 at the
time it was adopted in 1937, which, as interpreted by courts, did
not allow federal courts to issue prehearing document subpoenas
on non-parties:
[W]e believe that a reasonable argument can be
made that a literal reading of Section 7 actually furthers arbitration’s goal of “resolving disputes in a
55
56
57
58

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 407.
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timely and cost efficient manner.” Painewebber Inc.
v. Hofmann, 984 F.2d 1372, 1380 (3d Cir.1993).
First, as noted above, until 1991 the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure themselves did not permit a federal court to compel pre-hearing document production by non-parties. That the federal courts were left
for decades to operate with this limitation of their
subpoena power strongly suggests that the result
produced by interpreting Section 7 of the FAA as
embodying a similar limitation is not absurd.59
Citing COMSAT, the second reason the Third Circuit provided
for concluding “it is not absurd to read the FAA as circumscribing
an arbitration panel’s power to affect those who did not agree to its
jurisdiction”60 is:
The requirement that document production be made
at an actual hearing may, in the long run, discourage
the issuance of large-scale subpoenas upon nonparties. This is so because parties that consider obtaining such a subpoena will be forced to consider
whether the documents are important enough to justify the time, money, and effort that the subpoenaing parties will be required to expend if an actual
appearance before an arbitrator is needed. Under a
system of pre-hearing document production, by
contrast, there is less incentive to limit the scope of
discovery and more incentive to engage in fishing
expeditions that undermine some of the advantages
of the supposedly shorter and cheaper system of arbitration.61
The Third Circuit expressly rejected the Fourth Circuit’s “special needs” standard as a potential exception to its holding, and
stated that it disagreed with the Eighth Circuit’s “power-by59

Id. at 409.
Id.
61
Id. (citing COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 269, 276
(4th Cir. 1999)).
60
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implication analysis,” reasoning instead that “[i]f the FAA had
been meant to confer . . . broader power, . . . the drafters would
have said so . . . .”62 Finally, the Third Circuit noted that if it is
desirable for arbitrators to possess the power to require non-parties
to produce documents without also subpoenaing them to appear in
person before the panel, the way to confer that power is by
“amending Section 7 of the FAA, just as Rule 45 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in 1991 to confer such a
power on district courts.”63
E.
Second Circuit
In Life Receivables Trust v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, Life Settlements Corp. d/b/a Peachtree Life Settlements
(“Peachtree”) purchased life insurance policies from elderly insureds for its own account and for related entities, such as Life Receivables Trust (the “Trust”).64 Peachtree receives contractual fees
from the Trust but it does not hold a financial interest in the
Trust.65 Instead, the Trust “pays the premiums on the policy while
the insured remains alive in order to keep the policies in force”
and, “[u]pon the insured’s demise, the Trust is paid the ‘net death
benefit’ on the policy.”66 “As a hedge against the possibility that
the insured might live past his or her projected life expectancy,
Peachtree buys contingent cost insurance (“CCI”) policies from
Syndicate 102 for the benefit of the Trust.”67 Hence, “[i]f the insured lives more than two years beyond his or her life expectancy,
Syndicate 102 pays the Trust the net death benefit and assumes the
policy itself.”68
In one instance, Syndicate 102 refused to pay the Trust net
death benefits on grounds that the Trust fraudulently misrepresented the date on which it acquired the policies at issue and had
62

Id. at 408.
Id. at 409.
64
Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d
210, 212 (2d Cir. 2008).
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
63
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fraudulently calculated the insured’s life expectancy.69 The agreement between Peachtree, the Trust, and Syndicate 102 contained
an arbitration clause.70 Pursuant to that clause, the Trust initiated
arbitration against Syndicate 102, during which Syndicate 102
submitted certain discovery requests from the Trust and Peachtree,
a non-party to the arbitration.71 Subsequently, “the arbitration panel issued a subpoena requiring Peachtree to produce responsive
documents” and “Peachtree filed suit in federal court and moved to
quash the subpoena.”72 The district court granted Syndicate 102’s
motion to enforce the subpoena.73
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and held that the documents had to be produced by a witness
at a hearing before the arbitrators.74 The Second Circuit began by
reiterating the established principle that the court’s only role when
faced with clear statutory language is to enforce that language “according to its terms.”75 Finding that the “language of section 7 is
straightforward and unambiguous,” the appellate court interpreted
that language to mean that “[d]ocuments are only discoverable in
arbitration when brought before arbitrators by a testifying witness.”76 The court further explained:
The FAA was enacted in a time when pre-hearing
discovery in civil litigation was generally not permitted. The fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were since enacted and subsequently broadened demonstrates that if Congress wants to expand
arbitral subpoena authority, it is fully capable of doing so. There may be valid reasons to empower arbitrators to subpoena documents from third parties,
but we must interpret a statute as it might be, since
“courts must presume that a legislature says in a
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Id.
Id. at 218–19.
Id. at 216.
Id.
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statute what it means and means in a statute what it
says . . . .” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S.
249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. [sic] 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391
(1992). A statute’s clear language does not morph
into something more just because courts think it
makes sense for it to do so.77
In reaching this conclusion, the Second Circuit “join[ed] the
Third Circuit in holding that Section 7 of the FAA does not authorize arbitrators to compel pre-hearing document discovery from
entities not party to the arbitration proceedings.”78
The Second Circuit noted that this outcome “does not leave arbitrators powerless” as arbitrators had other tools available to
compel discovery from non-parties.79 For instance, “where the
non-party to the arbitration is a party to the arbitration agreement,
there may be instances where formal joinder is appropriate, enabling arbitrators to exercise their contractual jurisdiction over parties before them.”80 Additionally, the arbitration panel or a single
arbitrator could summon a non-party to give testimony and produce documents at a time separate and apart from the conduct of a
final hearing.81
As a practical matter, it has become commonplace in sophisticated arbitration practice to designate a single member of a tribunal, often the Chair, to travel to the location of non-party witnesses
to summons them for the presentation of documents and testimony.82 This clunky process has permitted parties and arbitrators to
obtain essential evidence for decades.83
77

Id. at 217.
Id. at 216–17.
79
Id. at 218.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
See Rules of Arbitration, INT’L TRADE CTR., https://www.intracen.org/
Rules-of-Arbitration/ (last visited May 15, 2021) (“The appointed arbitrator can
require secretarial assistance from the Center, travel to the residence of the witness or any other place, and summon the witness to the Tribunal.”).
83
See Call Center Call Out, NPR (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.npr.org/
transcripts/918195277 (referring to the benefits of private arbitration as opposed
to the “clunky” judicial arbitration process).
78
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F.
Ninth Circuit
In CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, an arbitration panel in an
underlying arbitration had issued a subpoena against the appellee,
who was not a party to the arbitration, directing the appellee to
produce certain documents prior to an arbitration hearing.84 The
appellee did not comply and, subsequently, the appellants attempted to enforce the subpoena in federal court.85 The district court
held “that the FAA does not grant arbitrators the power to compel
the production of documents from third parties outside of a hearing.”86 After considering the text of the FAA, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.87The Ninth Circuit explained that:
A plain reading of the text of section 7 reveals that
an arbitrator’s power to compel the production of
documents is limited to production at an arbitration
hearing. The phrase “bring with them,” referring to
documents or other information, is used in conjunction with language granting an arbitrator the power
to “summon . . . any person to attend before them.”
Under this framework, any document productions
ordered against third parties can happen only “before” the arbitrator. The text of section 7 grants an
arbitrator no freestanding power to order third parties to produce documents other than in the context
of a hearing.88
The Ninth Circuit expressly noted the similar interpretation of
Section 7 by the Third, Second, and Fourth Circuits.89 It rejected
the approach taken by the Eighth Circuit based on the plain text of
the statute and practical consideration––that is, the view taken by
other circuits that “third parties did not agree to the arbitrator’s

84

CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 704–05 (9th Cir.

2017).
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 705.
Id.
Id. at 706–08.
Id. at 706 (citation omitted).
Id. at 707.
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jurisdiction and this limit on document discovery tends to greatly
lessen the production burden upon non-parties.”90
Two years after the Ninth Circuit’s decision in CVS Health, the
Eleventh Circuit issued Managed Care.91 As explained below, the
Eleventh Circuit adopted a similar, but even more limited, view of
arbitrators’ subpoena power under Section 7, like that taken by the
Second, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits.92
III.

THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT EXAMINES SECTION 7 IN MANAGED
CARE
In Managed Care, medical providers filed class action lawsuits
against managed care insurance companies, like CIGNA
Healthcare, Inc. (“CIGNA”), alleging that insurers improperly processed and rejected certain physicians’ claims for payment.93
CIGNA settled with the class plaintiffs and the court approved that
90

Id. at 708 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d
1145, 1150 (11th Cir. 2019).
92
The First, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have apparently not addressed the issue. However, district courts in the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have
adopted the majority position above. See Next Level Planning & Wealth Mgmt.,
LLC v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 18-MC-65, 2019 WL 585672, at *4 (E.D.
Wis. Feb. 13, 2019) (“The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has not
addressed the question. But district courts within the circuit have agreed with the
Second and Third Circuits.”) (compiling cases); Chicago Bridge & Iron Co.
N.V. v. TRC Acquisition, LLC, No. CIV.A. 14-1191, 2014 WL 3796395, at *3
(E.D. La. July 29, 2014) (“This Court agrees with the Second, Third, and Fourth
Circuits that Section 7 provides only for the issuance and enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum against non-parties who are compelled to testify as witnesses
before the arbitrator, not for a subpoena seeking merely the production of documents by a non-party who is not summoned to testify as a witness before the
arbitrator.”); Empire Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Penson Fin. Servs., Inc., No. CIV.A.
3:09-CV-2155D, 2010 WL 742579, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 3, 2010) (“The court
adopts the reasoning of the Third and Second Circuits and holds that § 7 of the
FAA does not authorize arbitrators to compel production of documents from a
non-party, unless they are doing so in connection with the non-party’s attendance at an arbitration hearing. As the Third Circuit reasoned, the text of § 7
mentions only orders to produce documents when brought with a witness to a
hearing.”).
93
Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1150.
91
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settlement agreement.94 “Following the settlement, Managed Care
Advisory Group, LLC (‘MCAG’), acting on behalf of some class
members, entered into an arbitration agreement with CIGNA in an
attempt to resolve a dispute over a portion of the settlement
funds.”95 “The Settlement Agreement did not provide for arbitration and MCAG was not a party to it.”96 The settlement administrator and certain reviewers involved in the processing and administration of the settlement agreement (the “Third-Parties”) were not
parties to the binding arbitration and the arbitration agreement was
only between MCAG and CIGNA.97
During the arbitration, the arbitrator issued summonses to the
Third-Parties requiring them to participate in the arbitration hearing by video and also required the summonsed parties to produce
documents.98 The Third-Parties objected to the summonses, which
led MCAG to file a motion in federal court seeking to enforce the
arbitration summonses under Section 7.99 The district court granted
MCAG’s motion and also noted that “[t]he Arbitrator shall be allowed to arbitrate the claims in the manner he sees fit.”100 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the “district court abused its
discretion in enforcing the arbitral summonses because the court
lacked power under Section 7 to order the witnesses to appear at
the video conference and provide pre-hearing discovery.”101
Addressing both of the arbitrator’s powers under Section 7, the
Eleventh Circuit interpreted the “plain meaning” of Section 7 “as
(1) requiring summonsed non-parties to appear in the physical
presence of the arbitrator as opposed to a video conference or tele94

Id.
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id. at 1152.
98
Id.at 1150–51.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 1153.
101
Id. at 1161. In addition to ruling on the propriety of prehearing discovery
from non-parties to an arbitration, the Eleventh Circuit addressed issues of finality of the district court’s order enforcing the arbitral summonses and the order
enforcing the settlement agreement; jurisdiction, venue, and service; and the
district court’s failure to enforce the settlement agreement and compel an accounting. Id. at 1154–63.
95
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conference; and (2) prohibiting pre-hearing discovery.”102 Interestingly, none of the earlier circuit court decisions addressed whether
arbitrators could compel a non-party to “attend”––either for production of documents or oral testimony, or both––by telephone,
video conference, or other communications technology.103
Expressly agreeing with the position taken by the Second,
Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit held that:
[T]he plain language of the statute is unambiguous
in requiring witnesses to appear before an arbitrator
and bring any documents with them, thus prohibiting pre-hearing discovery from non-parties. The
FAA confers the power to compel a non-party to attend an arbitration hearing and bring documents, but
it is silent regarding the power to compel documents
from non-parties without summoning the non-party
to testify. See 9 U.S.C. § 7. Thus, the FAA implicitly withholds the power to compel documents from
non-parties without summoning the non-party to
testify. And if Congress intended the arbitrators to
have the broader power to compel documents from
non-parties without summoning the non-party to
testify, it could have said so. Accordingly, we conclude that 9 U.S.C. § 7 does not permit pre-hearing
depositions and discovery from non-parties.104
The Eleventh Circuit proceeded to parse this holding. First, it
addressed the arbitrator’s power to compel attendance.105 Recall,
Section 7 states that “arbitrators . . . may summon in writing any
person to attend before them . . . as a witness.”106 To “ascertain the
meaning of ‘attendance’ and ‘before’” at the time Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, the Eleventh Circuit looked to “dictionaries”
from that time.107 Accordingly, the court concluded that:
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id. at 1161.
See discussion supra Part II.
Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1159–60.
Id. at 1154.
9 U.S.C. § 7 (emphasis added).
Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160.
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In 1925, “attendance” meant the “[a]ct of attending,” and “attend” meant “be present at.” See, e.g.,
H.W. Fowler & F.G. Fowler, The Concise Oxford
Dictionary of Current English 52 (1926). Similarly,
“before” meant “in [the] presence of.” Id. at 74.
And “presence” meant “place where person is,”
while “present” meant “[b]eing in the place in question.” Id. at 650. Thus, Section 7 does not authorize
district courts to compel witnesses to appear in locations outside the physical presence of the arbitrator,
so the court may not enforce an arbitral summons
for a witness to appear via video conference.108
As applied to the facts of the case, the Eleventh Circuit found
that the district court erred in enforcing the summonses when the
arbitrator would have been located in Miami while the non-parties
were in their respective states, and the hearing would have taken
place via video conference.109
Moving to the second power granted to arbitrators under Section 7––an arbitrator’s power to compel a witness “to bring with
him or them” relevant documents––the Eleventh Circuit heavily
relied on the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Hay Group to conclude
that prehearing discovery “is not authorized by the FAA.”110 A
witness must appear in the physical presence of an arbitrator and
bring documents at the time of the hearing.111 The Eleventh Circuit
agreed with Hay Group that “[e]nforcing Section 7’s prohibition
on pre-hearing discovery does not lead to an absurd result because
it will force the parties to consider whether the documents are important enough to justify” resources “the subpoenaing parties will
be required to expend if an actual appearance before an arbitrator
is needed” and “will induce the arbitrator to weigh whether the
production of the documents is necessary.”112
108

Id.
Id.
110
Id. at 1161.
111
Id.
112
Id. (citing Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 409
(3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109
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The Eleventh Circuit has thus taken a strict textualist approach
to Section 7, as the majority of other Circuits have done.113 This
stands in contrast to the Eighth Circuit’s––and even the Sixth Circuit’s suggested––more policy-based approach to the issue.114 This
Article does not criticize either approach. However, the Eleventh
Circuit currently stands alone, even among the textualist courts, in
prohibiting the use of video technology under Section 7.115 As discussed in the next Part, there is room for another textualist approach to the issue of video technology under Section 7.
AN ALTERNATIVE, PERHAPS TIMELIER, TEXTUAL APPROACH
TO SECTION 7
On its face, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Managed Care
would appear to be a disciplined textual analysis; it consults a dictionary, one published near the time the FAA was adopted, to aid
the court in its interpretation of the language of Section 7.116 This
approach to statutory construction places the Eleventh Circuit firmly on the side of circuits that have embraced a textual approach to
Section 7 and rejects the position of other circuits that have gone
beyond the text of Section 7 to imply additional authority of arbitrators issuing summonses and courts asked to enforce those sumIV.

113

See id. at 1160 (“Looking to dictionaries from the time of Section 7’s
enactment makes clear that a court order compelling the ‘attendance’ of a witness ‘before’ the arbitrator meant compelling the witness to be in the physical
presence of the arbitrator.”); CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703,
706 (9th Cir. 2017) (grounding analysis on the plain text of Section 7); Life
Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216 (2d
Cir. 2008) (same); Hay Grp., Inc., 360 F.3d at 406 (same); COMSAT Corp. v.
Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d at 269, 275 (4th Cir. 1999) (same).
114
See In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 2000);
Am. Fed’n of Television and Radio Artists v. WJBK-TV, 164 F.3d 1004, 1009
(6th Cir. 1999).
115
See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160. Some other circuit courts have
discussed arbitrators’ power to summon non-parties, but none addressed whether
arbitrators could compel a non-party to attend via telephone or video conference.
See CVS Health, 878 F.3d at 706; Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 216–17; Hay
Grp., 360 F.3d at 408; In re Sec. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 228 F.3d at 870–71;
COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d at 269, 275–76; Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1009.
116
See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160.
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monses.117 Certainly, a textualist approach to interpreting the FAA
is not new, nor is it free of controversy.118 In fact, it is the dominant method employed by courts in the United States.119 In the
words of Justice Elena Kagan, “we’re all textualists now . . . .”120
For textualists, “[t]he only relevant congressional intent is the
intent that a court can glean from the plain meaning of the statutory
language.”121 Consequently, textualists do not advocate “judicial
review of legislative history and other materials that are not contained in a statute’s language . . . .”122 This supposedly guards
against “judicial activism through the manipulation of legislative
history and other extrinsic materials.”123 To this end,
“[d]ictionaries and canons of statutory interpretation assist textualist[s] in their efforts to garner a statute’s plain meaning.”124
117
Compare Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160 (embracing textual approach
to Section 7 in its use of dictionary to interpret Section 7), CVS Health, 878 F.3d
at 706 (reaching a conclusion after “[a] plain reading of the text of section 7”
and “considering the text of the FAA”), Life Receivables, 549 F.3d at 216 (emphasizing court’s role to enforce statute’s language “according to its terms”),
Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 406 (looking at “unambiguous” language of Section 7,
which overrides “a court’s policy preferences”), and COMSAT Corp., 190 F.3d
at 275 (interpreting Section 7 “[b]y its own terms”), with In re Sec. Life Ins. Co.
of Am., 228 F.3d at 870–71 (ruling with a policy approach rather than a textual
approach), and Am. Fed’n, 164 F.3d at 1009 (taking a more policy-based approach in interpreting Section 7).
118
See Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme
Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 99, 157 (2006); Larry J. Pittman, The Federal Arbitration Act:
The Supreme Court’s Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a
Proposal for Change, 53 ALA. L. REV. 789, 830 (2002).
119
See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2118, 2118 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES
(2014)).
120
Id. (quoting Justice Elena Kagan as saying: “I think we’re all textualists
now in a way that just was not remotely true when Justice Scalia joined the
bench.” (citation omitted)).
121
Pittman, supra note 118, at 802.
122
Id.
123
Id. at 802–03. Justice Scalia “support[ed] a ‘holistic textualism’ approach
whereby a court should obtain the plain meaning of the relevant statutory provision by examining both similar language in other provisions of the same statute
and similar language in other statutes.” Id. at 803.
124
Id.
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In this Part, this Article will first examine how the U.S. Supreme Court has used a textualist approach to interpret language in
Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA, reviewing two decisions that analyzed the impact of the Court’s subsequent expansion of the Commerce Clause, on the meaning of the terms used by Congress in
1925—“involving commerce” in Section 2 and “engaged in foreign or interstate commerce” in Section 1.125 The two decisions,
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. Inc. v. Dobson and Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, served to expand the applicability of the FAA to
nearly all employment agreements in the United States, effectively
preempting state law governing such employment relations.126
Then, the Article will propose an alternative interpretation of
Section 7 based on a textual analysis.127 This alternate interpretation is particularly timely considering the limitations on in-person
interactions following the COVID-19 pandemic.128 Finally, the
Article will compare its proposed alternate textual interpretation of
Section 7 to the framework of existing rules on virtual proceedings
by arbitral bodies.129
A.
The Supreme Court, Textualism, and the FAA
Perhaps no federal statute has undergone greater modification
through decades of decisions by the Supreme Court than has the
FAA.130 The Supreme Court has employed a textual analysis in
some of the most consequential decisions regarding the FAA.131
And no single Supreme Court decision interpreting the FAA
arouses greater controversy than its 5-4 decision in Circuit City
Stores, in which it held that the FAA applies and preempts state
125
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74
(1995); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 118 (2001).
126
See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 272, 279; Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
127
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
128
See Protect Yourself & Others, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-gettingsick/prevention.html (last updated Mar. 8, 2021) (recommending at least six feet
of distance between individuals and that persons avoid crowds and poorly ventilated indoor spaces).
129
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
130
See Moses, supra note 118, at 112–13.
131
Id. at 131.
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law that seeks to prohibit or limit mandatory arbitration provisions
in employment contracts.132 That decision, and the controversy it
engendered, arises from differing applications of textual analysis to
the scope of the FAA as expressed in Section 2133 and the scope of
the exception to its scope as expressed in Section 1.134
In Allied-Bruce, the Court interpreted Section 2’s “contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce”135 phrase as implementing Congress’s intent “to exercise [its] commerce power to
the full.”136 In Circuit City, the Court, in a highly charged decision,137 interpreted Section 1’s “contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in
foreign or interstate commerce”138 phrase as implementing Congress’s intent to exempt from the FAA only employment contracts
of “transportation workers.”139 The majority reached its conclusion
by applying a textual analysis that relied on “the maxim ejusdem
generis, the statutory canon that ‘[w]here general words follow
specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are
construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects
enumerated by the preceding specific words.’”140
In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, Justice Souter criticized the majority’s application of
the textualist approach and applied his own textual analysis to
132

See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122 (2001).
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74
(1995).
134
See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
135
9 U.S.C. § 2.
136
See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277.
137
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that twenty-one attorneys
general had joined an amicus opposing the preemption of state laws restricting
or limiting the inclusion of arbitration clauses in employment contracts. Circuit
City, 532 U.S. at 121. Sidestepping the argument, he simply pointed out that the
argument was misdirected because it is relevant instead to the Court’s decision
in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), holding that Congress intended the FAA to apply in state courts, and to pre-empt state antiarbitration laws to
the contrary, and that Congress had not amended the FAA in response to the
Southland decision. Id. at 122.
138
9 U.S.C. § 1.
139
Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
140
Id. at 114–15 (citations omitted).
133

2021]

BAD LAW OR JUST BAD TIMING?

1061

reach a different outcome; that is, Justice Souter would have affirmed the decision of the Ninth Circuit, particularly its interpretation of Section 1 of the FAA as excluding all “contracts of employment.”141 Justice Souter reasoned:
In [Allied-Bruce,] . . . we decided that the elastic
understanding of § 2 was the more sensible way to
give effect to what Congress intended when it legislated to cover contracts “involving commerce,” a
phrase that we found an apt way of providing that
coverage would extend to the outer constitutional
limits under the Commerce Clause.142
Justice Souter concluded that “a correspondingly evolutionary
reading” of Section 1 should be applied.143 Thus, the dissenters in
Circuit City took the position that Section 1 of the FAA should be
given the same expansive interpretation previously applied by the
Court in Allied-Bruce to Section 2.144
The majority, in an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor, Scalia, and
Thomas, disagreed.145 In the Court’s opinion, Justice Kennedy explained the impact of the maxim ejusdim generis as follows:
Under this rule of construction the residual clause
should be read to give effect to the terms “seamen”
and “railroad employees,” and should itself be controlled and defined by reference to the enumerated
categories of workers which are recited just before
it; the interpretation of the clause pressed by respondent fails to produce these results.146
Thus, the majority concluded that only employment agreements of
seamen, railroad employees, and transportation workers engaged in
interstate commerce were excluded from the scope of the FAA by
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id. at 136–37 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 134.
Id.
See id. at 135.
Id. at 114 (majority opinion).
Id. at 115.
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the exclusion language in Section 1.147 Only two members of the
Circuit City court remain on the bench––Justice Thomas from the
majority and Justice Breyer from the dissent.148 However, textualism has become the dominant method of statutory interpretation by
the Court.149
The result of just these two Supreme Court decisions made the
FAA preemptively applicable to all employment contracts, other
than those involving maritime, railroad, and transportation workers
engaged in interstate commerce.150 Similar decisions by the Court
interpreting the FAA to apply to consumer and other contracts of
adhesion have made millions of employment and consumer disputes and countless commercial disputes involving an arbitration
clause subject to the jurisdiction of the FAA.151 In all such cases,
the authority of arbitrators to compel the production of evidence
from non-parties is solely derived from Section 7 of the FAA, unless the parties have chosen alternative arbitration law.152 This
147

Id. at 109.
See Current Members, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/
about/biographies.aspx (last visited May 15, 2021).
149
See Kavanaugh, supra note 119, at 2118.
150
See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272–73
(1995); Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119, 122.
151
These decisions expanding the applicability of the FAA include: AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011) (FAA preempts California state law rule that contracts barring class actions are unconscionable.); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 359 (2008) (FAA requires arbitration first even
when state law provides for administrative dispute resolution); Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 449 (2006) (arbitrators must first hear
challenge to legality of contract); Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S.
681, 687 (1996) (courts may not invalidate arbitration agreements under state
laws applicable only to arbitration provisions); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (punitive damages may be awarded by
arbitrators); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238 (1989)
(Securities Exchange Act claims are arbitrable under the FAA); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 491 (1987) (FAA pre-empts § 229 of California Labor Code);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (FAA applicable to contracts
under state law).
152
The provisions of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act, enacted by twenty-two states, permit more extensive arbitrator summonses, but courts have not
yet addressed whether Section 7 of the FAA preempts such conflicting provisions. Arbitration Act, Uniform Law Commission, https://www.
148
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means, following Managed Care, in the Eleventh Circuit, arbitrators may not require non-parties to appear at hearings by video link
or other technology if the arbitration is governed by the FAA.153
There are meaningful consequences to this position––
consequences that could have been avoided had the Eleventh Circuit employed an alternative textual interpretation of Section 7.154
This Article discusses one such alternative interpretation in the
next Part.155
B.
Alternative Textual Interpretation of Section 7
As then-Judge Alito said in Hay Group, “[i]n interpreting a
statute, [courts] must, of course, begin with the text. ‘The Supreme
Court has repeatedly explained that recourse to legislative history
or underlying legislative intent is unnecessary when a statute’s text
is clear and does not lead to an absurd result.’” 156 Consequently,
this Part’s alternative interpretation of Section 7 starts with an
analysis of the language of Section 7 (aided by hypothetical facts),
followed by an analysis of whether the proposed interpretation
would yield an absurd result.
1.
ANALYSIS OF SECTION 7’S TEXT
To aid in the analysis of the language of Section 7, consider the
following hypothetical: Assume an arbitrator, in a case administered by the American Arbitration Association (the “AAA”), issued a summons to a non-party, John Doe, to provide testimony
and bring documents responsive to a duces tecum request attached
to the summons. Mr. Doe resides in Michigan. The arbitrator is a
lawyer in Miami. The case was initiated by a Notice of Arbitration
uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=a0ad71d6085f-4648-857a-e9e893ae2736 (last visited May 15, 2021); see Albert Bates,
Non-Party Discovery in Commercial Arbitration: Legal Arbitration: Legal Hurdles and Practical Suggestions, 10 PENN. BAR ASS’N 9, 10 (2005); infra Part
IV.C.
153
See infra Part V (discussing practical impact of Managed Care on arbitration proceedings conducted during and after the pandemic).
154
See discussion infra Part V.
155
Id.
156
Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 406 (3d Cir.
2004) (citation omitted).
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filed with the AAA. Also, assume that the summons was issued
after May 15, 2020, and that the arbitrator ordered a final hearing
in the case to be held by Zoom video conference commencing December 4, 2020, over Respondent’s objection. The summons requests the non-party witness to make available electronic copies of
any responsive documents he may have two weeks in advance of
the hearing by delivering them to the arbitrator, but the summons
assures him that if he does not want to produce them in advance,
he may prepare electronic copies and have them available with him
when he accepts the Zoom invitation issued by the arbitrator (or
case manager) pursuant to the summons to present testimony during the Zoom hearing.
The summons requests the non-party witness to inform the arbitrator and the parties’ counsel not later than June 15, 2020,
whether the witness intends to comply with the summons. The Respondent and the non-party witness both object to the summons on
June 15, and the arbitrator rules it must be honored after hearing
objections from Respondent and counsel who appears for the limited purpose of objecting to the summons. Respondent and the
non-party witness file motions to quash in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. With these hypothetical facts, this Article now walks through the textual analysis.
i.
Consulting Dictionaries to Assist in Textual Analysis
As the district court would do in the above hypothetical, the
analysis begins with the text of Section 7 and the language of the
summons. Recall, in pertinent part, Section 7 provides that arbitrators “may summon in writing any person to attend before them or
any of them as a witness and in a proper case to bring with him or
them any book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed
material as evidence in the case.”157 As the Eleventh Circuit did in
Managed Care,158 the hypothetical district court would consult
dictionaries from the time of FAA’s enactment to understand the
language used by Congress in Section 7.
157

9 U.S.C. § 7.
See Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939
F.3d 1145, 1160 (11th Cir. 2019).
158
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Assume for this hypothetical, however, that the district court
utilizes more than a single dictionary. Therefore, in addition to the
one used by the Eleventh Circuit––H.W. Fowler & F.G. Fowler,
The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 52 (1926) (the
“Concise Oxford”)159––this analysis also consults the Webster’s
Home and Office Dictionary (1921) (“Webster’s”) and Collier’s
New Dictionary of the English Language (1926) (“Collier’s”).160
In both Webster’s and Collier’s, “attend” is defined as: “to wait
upon; accompany or be present with; serve or look after in any capacity; be present at; accompany or follow; v.i. to pay heed or regard to; listen; be in attendance upon.”161
“Attendance” is defined as “the act of attending,” or “waiting
on.”162 And “before” is defined as: “before (be-for’), prep, in front
of; preceding in space, time, or rank; in presence or sight of; under
jurisdiction of; rather than; earlier than: adv. in front; in advance;
previously; formerly; already.”163
Based on the Eleventh Circuit’s discussion in Managed Care,
the Concise Oxford dictionary apparently does not include the italicized options as possible definitions of the pertinent terms of Section 7 being analyzed here.164 There are at least four dictionaries
from the relevant time period that the author has considered; two
have the above referenced definitions used by the Eleventh Circuit
(the Concise Oxford and the Pocket Oxford Dictionary (the “Pocket Oxford”)) and two have alternative definitions (Webster’s and
Collier’s) that could lead to a different meaning for Section 7.
159

See id. Similar to the Concise Oxford dictionary used by the Managed
Care court, the Pocket Oxford Dictionary from 1924 (“Pocket Oxford”) defines
“attend” as “turn or apply one’s mind” or “be present, be at or with, accompany.” F. G. FOWLER & H. W. FOWLER, THE POCKET OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
CURRENT ENGLISH 45 (1924).
160
NOAH WEBSTER, WEBSTER’S HOME, SCHOOL AND OFFICE DICTIONARY
50, 64 (1921); P. F. COLLIER & SON COMPANY, COLLIER’S NEW DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 64, 93 (1926).
161
WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 50; COLLIER, supra note 160, at 64.
162
WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 50; COLLIER, supra note 160, at 64.
163
WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 64; COLLIER, supra note 160, at 93.
164
The 1921 edition of the Concise Oxford dictionary does not define “attend,” “attendance,” and “before” to mean, by interpretation, “to pay heed or
regard to . . . the jurisdiction of.” See FOWLER & FOWLER, supra note 159, at 52–
53, 74.
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Consulting Webster’s or Collier’s, Section 7’s “to attend before
them or any of them”165 phrase may be interpreted to mean “to pay
heed or regard to . . . the jurisdiction of”166 the arbitrators, or any
of them. It could also be interpreted to mean “to be in attendance
upon . . . the presence or sight of” the arbitrators, or any of
them.167 Alternatively, this language may be interpreted the way
the Eleventh Circuit interpreted it in Managed Care, using the
1926 edition of the Concise Oxford.168
The analysis does not end here. Courts should be disciplined in
their use of dictionaries. Thus, this Article proceeds to determine
whether the analysis displays such discipline.
ii.
Employing “Best Practices” for Using Dictionaries
Numerous authors have criticized the Supreme Court’s use of
dictionaries in support of textual interpretation of statutes.169 In a
2010 Duke Law Journal article, one author captured the issue well:
Textualism demands adherence to an objective,
original meaning of the text. Thus, it is no surprise
that dictionaries are so appealing to textualists: dictionaries present an aura of objective authority, and
there are dictionaries from any time period relevant
for legal analysis. But fidelity to textualist principles requires a disciplined approach to using dictionaries because they are neither as objective nor as
165

Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939 F.3d
1145, 1160 (11th Cir. 2019).
166
WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 50, 64; COLLIER, supra note 160, at 64, 93
(emphasis added).
167
Webster’s dictionary defines presence as “the state or quality of being
present; quickness at expedients; society”; and defines “present” as “being in a
certain place; at hand or in sight; at this time; not past or future; instant or immediate . . . .” WEBSTER, supra note 160, at 391.
168
See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1160.
169
See, e.g., James J. Brudney and Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The
Supreme Court’s Thirst for Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 502 (2013); John Calhoun, Measuring the Fortress:
Explaining Trends in Supreme Court and Circuit Court Dictionary Use, 124
YALE L.J. 484, 487 (2014); Kevin Werbach, Looking It Up: Dictionaries and
Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1438–42 (1994).
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authoritative as they seem. And their misuse can
lead to exactly what textualists often bemoan: the
personal preferences of judges creeping into their
interpretations of statutes or the Constitution.170
Many have suggested ways in which courts might do a better
job of using dictionaries. For example, Professors Brudney and
Baum have recommended the Supreme Court consider adopting a
“three-step plan in order to foster a healthier approach to its dictionary habit.”171 Stated simply, the three steps are to: (1) recognize that it has a problem (e.g., that it is over-emphasizing the value of dictionaries and misusing them); (2) change its method of
using dictionaries so it is more transparent; and (3) stop using dictionaries as a barrier to larger contextual considerations.172 In another instance, the Harvard Symposium has suggested that “[i]f the
Court relies on a dictionary, it should make at least some prima
facie argument about the relevance of that particular dictionary for
interpretation of the statute or constitutional provision under consideration.”173
Building on the Harvard Symposium’s position, the author of
the 2010 Duke Law Journal article developed, and proposed that
courts adopt, a detailed framework of best practices for textualist
use of dictionaries.174 The framework begins with the basic observation that a dictionary “is simply the window through which one
seeks to find . . . meaning” and that “the end goal is finding the
correct meaning within the lexicon––not the dictionary . . . .”175
From there, it proposes courts: (1) use only contextual analysis, not
the definition to verify a presumed definition; (2) establish only
outer boundaries; (3) use contemporaneous research on word
meaning; (4) justify the choice of dictionary and definition; (5) use
multiple dictionaries; (6) acknowledge contrary definitions and
dictionaries; (7) account for weaknesses in older dictionaries; and
170

Phillip A. Rubin, War of the Words: How Courts Can Use Dictionaries in
Accordance with Textualist Principles, 60 DUKE L.J. 167, 206 (2010).
171
Brudney & Baum, supra note 169, at 579.
172
Id. at 579–80.
173
Werbach, supra note 169, at 1453.
174
Rubin, supra note 170, at 189.
175
Id. at 189.
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(8) recognize the limitations.176 Regarding points five and six, Part
IV.B.1.i. consulted multiple dictionaries and acknowledged the
existence of contrary definitions.177 These parts of the framework
are, therefore, already met. This Article briefly examines the other
points.
Using only contextual analysis means the court should attempt
to place the meaning of the word into the context of its use and
time.178 In 1925, telephones had recently become a tool of business,179 television had not yet been invented,180 and the idea of an
internet would have been considered in only the creative mind of
Jules Verne.181 As can be seen from the Supreme Court’s analysis
of Sections 1 and 2 of the FAA in Circuit City and Allied-Bruce,
respectively, the scope of the U.S. Constitution’s Interstate Commerce Clause as a source of authority for Congress to legislate was
significantly restricted but would later become less so.182 Therefore, considering the text of Section 7 in the context of 1925 America and without resorting to legislative history, this paper concludes that it is likely Congress was using the words “attend,” “attendance,” and “before” in their physical sense.
To the next point under the framework––establishing only outer boundaries–––the dictionary should not be used to limit or constrict the possible meanings listed in contemporary dictionaries,
but rather to establish only the broadest reasonable meaning. 183 As
applied here, this is where the hypothetical textual analysis departs
from the majority of circuits that have interpreted Section 7 to require a live witness, physically delivering documents to an arbitra176

Id. at 190–98.
See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.i.
178
See id. at 190–91.
179
BELL TEL. SYS., THE MAGIC OF COMMUNICATION 41 (1953) (“1914, Feb.
26 - Boston-Washington underground telephone cable placed in commercial
service.”).
180
Mitchell Stephens, History of Television, GROLIER ENCYC.,
https://stephens.hosting.nyu.edu/History%20of%20Television%20page.html
(last visited May 15, 2021).
181
See Jules Verne, NEW WORLD ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://www.
newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Jules_Verne (last visited May 15, 2021).
182
See supra Part IV.A.
183
Rubin, supra note 170, at 191.
177
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tor.184 It also departs from the holding of Managed Care to the extent that case prohibits use of video technology.185 This Article
concludes, instead, that physical presence is not a necessary component in a clear and unambiguous meaning of “attend before”
under the definitions derived from Webster’s or Collier’s. Rather,
“attend before” and “to be in attendance before” more likely invoke a type of adjudicative186 presence before the arbitrators.
Thus, to the extent a dictionary should only establish an outer
boundary, this Article concludes that ignoring the possible meanings available under Webster’s and Collier’s would not comply
with the suggested “best practices” for using dictionaries.
The next requirement under the framework is to justify the
choice of dictionary and definition.187 Of course, it may be more
appropriate to use the two British dictionaries (Concise Oxford and
Pocket Oxford rather than the two American dictionaries (e.g., Collier’s and Webster’s)) to determine the intent of Congress in
1925,188 but this Article decides that the dictionaries published in
184

CVS Health Corp. v. Vividus, LLC, 878 F.3d 703, 706 (9th Cir. 2017);
Life Receivables v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216 (2d
Cir. 2008); Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 407 (3d
Cir. 2004); COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci. Found., 190 F.3d 269, 275 (4th Cir.
1999).
185
See Managed Care Advisory Group v. Cigna Healthcare, 939 F.3d 1145,
1161 (11th Cir. 2019).
186
Judge Alito interpreted Section 7 as requiring “physical presence.” Hay
Grp., 360 F.3d at 407; see infra Part IV.B.1.ii. But see Int’l Com. Disp. Committee Arb. Committee N.Y. City B. Ass’n, A Model Federal Arbitration Summons
to Testify and Present Documentary Evidence at an Arbitration Hearing, 26
AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 157, 170 (2015) [hereinafter NYCB White Paper] (“[W]e
believe FAA Section 7 is reasonably read not to impose any requirement that the
arbitrator appear in the physical presence of the witness––that adjudicative presence of the arbitrator (to rule on objections and declare evidence admitted) is the
touchstone of Section 7 according to the interpretation given in the Life Receivables and Hay Group decisions . . . .”).
187
Rubin, supra note 170, at 192.
188
See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47
BUFF. L. REV. 227, 238 (1999) (“Called the ‘most masterly and ambitious philological exercise ever undertaken,’ the first edition of the Oxford English Dictionary was completed in 1933 and contained more than 400,000 entries supported by nearly two million citations.”).
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America more likely provide a better window or proxy for the lexicon of the United States in the early twentieth century. As noted in
the Publishers’ Preface to the 1926 edition of Collier’s:
The Vocabulary, carefully chosen, is not only more
comprehensive than that of any other dictionary of
equal size, but it is also more modern. It is thoroughly up-to-date, and meets all the wants of the
general reader of the present day. The words
brought into our language by the World War, the
new technical terms that mark recent advances in
science, and the words that great political changes
in nations have made a feature of modern speech
are here collected and defined—a boon to the student of current world progress.189
This Article concludes, therefore, that Webster’s and Collier’s
are appropriate for interpreting Section 7.
To the final point in the framework––accounting for weaknesses in older dictionaries190––notwithstanding Collier’s glowing
prefatory note quoted above, the creation of dictionaries in the early twentieth century was a laborious and imprecise process.191 Still,
the fact that Collier’s and Webster’s include definitions provided
in the Oxford dictionary and add additional possible definitions,
particularly the possible use of “before” to include the concept of
“jurisdiction,” is a reasonable indication that Collier’s Preface was
not merely marketing. Rather, it is likely that this additional use of
the word “before” had recently become a part of the American lexicon and is a reliable indication of its value.
Having gone through the suggested “best practices” for using
dictionaries, this Article concludes that Congress’s language in
Section 7 is sufficiently broad to permit use of technology that did
not exist and that would not possibly have been contemplated
when the statute was drafted and adopted in 1925. The analysis
here is similar to the textual interpretation employed by the Su189
190
191

COLLIER, supra note 160, at iii.
Rubin, supra note 170, at 196.
Id. at 178–82.
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preme Court in Allied-Bruce, where it concluded that by using the
phrase “involving commerce,” Congress intended to extend to the
outer limits under the Commerce Clause.192 Here, based on the
textual analysis of the language in Section 7, it seems more likely
that Congress intended for arbitrators to have the authority to issue
summonses compelling non-party witnesses to be in attendance
under the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to provide oral and documentary evidence relevant to the proceeding. While this certainly
includes the authority to compel attendance in the physical presence of the arbitrator, that is not the outer boundary of Congress’s
intent. Rather, it also includes the intent that as “new technical
terms that mark recent advances in science” were added to Collier’s,193 the power of arbitrators should include the authority to
compel a witness to “attend” in the presence of the arbitrators
through telephone, and later video or other future technology, and
to bring with him electronic versions of responsive documents that
are provided to the arbitrators in the first instance to “pay heed or
regard to” their “jurisdiction[al]” authority.
2. DOES THE ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 7
PRODUCE AN ABSURD RESULT?
It would be difficult to find a lawyer today serving as counsel
in domestic arbitration proceedings who has not requested an arbitrator or tribunal to summons a person to appear before the arbitrator of the tribunal by Zoom or other video conference technology
and to have with him responsive documents, which through scanning or other similar technology, may be made available to the tribunal at the same time as the witness appears. It has probably happened hundreds of times each day since pandemic restrictions
forced arbitral tribunals to conduct their proceedings by video conference technology.194 Moreover, it is not only since the pandemic
192

Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273–74
(1995); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 112 (2001)
(“We had occasion in Allied–Bruce . . . , 115 S.Ct. 834, to consider the significance of Congress’ use of the words ‘involving commerce.’”).
193
COLLIER, supra note 160, at iii.
194
See Al Tamimi, Use of Modern Technology in Arbitration: Evolution
Through Necessity (July 31, 2020), https://www.lexology.com/library/
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that lawyers and others involved in arbitration have embraced an
interpretation of Section 7 like the one reached by the analysis in
this Article.195
In fact, following the 2013 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45 to provide for nationwide service of subpoenas, the
International Commercial Disputes Committee and the Arbitration
Committee of the New York City Bar Association developed an
annotated “Model Federal Arbitration Summons to Testify and
Present Documentary Evidence at an Arbitration Hearing” (the
“NYCB White Paper”).196 The NYCB White Paper was designed
to bring “together in one resource guidance on law and practice in
regard to the issuance by arbitrators of compulsory process for evidence to be obtained from non-party witnesses.”197 The annotations provide guidance to counsel and tribunals to effectively obtain documentary evidence from non-parties in light of the split
among the federal circuits and between the Second Circuit and
New York state courts with respect to pre-hearing discovery from
non-parties in arbitration.198 In 2015, when the NYCB White Paper
was completed, regarding the place of the hearing, the authors
opined:
Hearing witnesses by video link. . . . Section 7’s objectives (as considered by some courts) of requiring
a hearing are achieved, even though the witness and
the arbitrators come together by electronic means.
Electronic presence of the arbitrator is an adequate
substitute for physical presence, because the arbitrator could lawfully attend in person.199

detail.aspx?g=8869fc87-e787-419c-ab6a-23e33905a366 (explaining how international arbitration practitioners had to rely on technological means to resolve
disputes given the restrictions of COVID-19 pandemic).
195
See supra Part IV.B.1. (concluding that text of Section 7 permits use of
remote technology).
196
NYCB White Paper, supra note 186.
197
Id. at 158.
198
See id. at 161–71.
199
Id. at 170 (emphasis in original).

2021]

BAD LAW OR JUST BAD TIMING?

1073

Notwithstanding this position on hearing by video link, the
NYCB White Paper cautioned counsel and arbitrators to attempt to
provide in the subpoena that the arbitrators will attend in person:
While we believe FAA Section 7 is reasonably read
not to impose any requirement that the arbitrator
appear in the physical presence of the witness––that
adjudicative presence of the arbitrator (to rule on
objections and declare evidence admitted) is the
touchstone of Section 7 according to the interpretation given in the Life Receivables and Hay Group
decisions––it is prudent to avoid controversy on this
point by providing in the subpoena that the arbitrators will attend in person unless otherwise agreed.
However, if a subpoena does call for video-linked
hearing, enforceability of the subpoena might be
supported by reference to FRCP 43, which expresses the judicial preference for testimony in open
court but provides that “for good cause in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards,
the court may permit testimony in open court by
contemporaneous transmission from a different location.”200
Whether one agrees with the NYCB White Paper’s interpretation of Judge Alito’s decision, when the Third Circuit entered its
decision in Hay Group in 2004, use of video technology to conduct
arbitral proceedings and court proceedings was in its infancy, later
to be thrown into young adulthood by the pandemic in 2020.201
The narrow issue before the Third Circuit was whether pre-hearing
production of documents without requiring a witness was permissible under Section 7.202 As discussed in Part II above, the Hay
Group court held that “documents only” compulsory production
200

Id. (internal citation omitted).
See The History of Videoconferencing, BUS. MATTERS (Jan. 8, 2015),
https://bmmagazine.co.uk/tech/history-video-conferencing/ (noting that Skype
only first became available in 2003).
202
See Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 406 (3d
Cir. 2004).
201
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and compulsory pre-hearing testimony, with or without documents,
were not permissible under the clear and unambiguous language of
Section 7.203 The Third Circuit concluded that its interpretation of
Section 7 did not produce an absurd result based on similar language used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 at the time it was
adopted in 1937 and practical considerations of how broader discovery powers under Section 7 could undermine arbitration’s goal
of being a “shorter and cheaper system.”204 There is no suggestion,
however, in the majority opinion or the concurring opinion by
Judge Chertoff that the possible use of video technology under
Section 7 was even considered.
Apparently, also considering whether the result was absurd,
Judge Chertoff noted in his concurrence:
Under section 7 of the Federal Arbitration Act, arbitrators have the power to compel a third-party witness to appear with documents before a single arbitrator, who can then adjourn the proceedings. . . . To
be sure, this procedure requires the arbitrators to
decide that they are prepared to suffer some inconvenience of their own in order to mandate what is,
in reality, an advance production of documents. But
that is not necessarily a bad thing, since it will induce the arbitrators and parties to weigh whether
advance production is really needed. And the availability of this procedure within the existing statutory language should satisfy the desire that there be
some mechanism “to compel pre-arbitration discovery upon a showing of special need or hardship.”205
One wonders whether Judge Alito or Judge Chertoff would have
reached the same conclusion about the absurdity of requiring
“physical presence” when neither word appears in the language of
Section 7 if they had been focused on video technology as an adequate substitute for “physical presence” at a hearing before the ar203

See supra notes 50–62 and accompanying text.
Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 409; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
205
Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 413–14 (citing COMSAT Corp. v. Nat’l Sci.
Found., 190 F.3d 269, 276 (4th Cir. 1999)) (Chertoff, J., concurring).
204
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bitrators and within the meaning of Section’s 7 to “attend before”
phrase.206
However differently the Third Circuit might have performed its
textual analysis had the summons called for the documents to be
produced by a witness by means of a video link at the time of a
hearing that included the arbitrators, in the post-pandemic world,
this Article’s alternative textual interpretation of Section 7 is a
proper result of consulting contemporaneous dictionaries and it
does not produce an absurd result. To the contrary, it produces a
result entirely consistent with the normal practices in arbitration
that both preceded and succeeded the pandemic without altering
the outcome of the Hay Group decision, other than to link the
presence of the arbitrators to the witness and the production by
means of new technology.
C.

The Alternative Textual Interpretation Comports with
Existing Standards in the Field of Arbitration
Finding that Section 7 of the FAA requires adjudicative as opposed to physical presence not only passes the absurdity test, but it
is also a result that reflects the practicalities of arbitration in the
modern world.207 Even before COVID-19, parties and arbitration
institutions have employed virtual technology to streamline and
add efficiencies to the arbitration process, all while aiming to preserve arbitration’s purpose of being an expeditious process.208
206

See Gaela R. Normile, Virtually Impossible: Eleventh Circuit’s Denial of
Non-Parties Attending Arbitration Hearings via Video or Telephone,
MARTINDALE
(Oct.
27,
2020),
https://www.martindale.com/legalnews/article_vandeventer-black-llp_2534575.htm (“Although it was not a possibility to virtually appear at an arbitration hearing in 1925, such a strict interpretation of Section 7 of the FAA may unnecessarily burden arbitration.”).
207
See Kateryna Honcharenko & Mercy McBrayer, Guidance Note on Remote Dispute Resolution Proceedings, CHARTERED INST. ARB.,
https://www.ciarb.org/media/9013/remote-hearings-guidance-note_final_
140420.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021) (noting the need for virtual proceeding
as “travel bans and severe government restrictions become more widespread”).
208
See Virtual Hearings, AAA-ICDR, https://go.adr.org/covid-19-virtualhearings.htmlhttps://go.adr.org/covid-19-virtual-hearings.html (last visited May
15, 2021) (stressing that “[v]irtual hearings are not a new concept” and have
been an “option to parties for years”).
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Likewise, rules and guidelines have been in place to facilitate prehearing discovery, including for non-parties to the arbitration proceedings.209
1.
THE REVISED UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT
To illustrate, “to make the [arbitration] proceedings fair, expeditious, and cost effective,” at the request of a party or witness,
Section 17 of the revised Uniform Arbitration Act (the “RUAA”)
authorizes an arbitrator to “permit a deposition of any witness to be
taken for use as evidence at the hearing, including a witness who
cannot be subpoenaed for or is unable to attend a hearing.”210 This
provision covers non-parties to the arbitration proceedings.211 Still,
the RUAA was mindful of preserving “the main advantages of arbitration in terms of cost, speed and efficiency” and “safeguard[ing] the rights of third parties,” while also “insuring that
there is sufficient disclosure of information to provide for a full
and fair hearing.”212 Thus, as it relates to non-parties to the arbitration, the RUAA anticipates that the arbitrator will take “the interests of such ‘affected persons’ into account in determining whether
and to what extent discovery is appropriate.”213
Historically, the UAA, which is drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, is modeled on
the FAA.214 Due to “the increasing use of arbitration, the greater
complexity of many disputes resolved by arbitration, and the developments of the law in th[e] area,”215 many issues have arisen in
modern arbitration that were not present in 1955, when the UAA
was adopted.216 The RUAA examines these issues and aims to
209
See Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 407 n.1 (noting that many states have adopted
statutes that “explicitly grant arbitrators the power to issue pre-hearing document production subpoenas on third parties”).
210
UNIF. ARB. ACT § 17(b) (NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE L.
2000).
211
Id.
212
Id. at § 17 cmt. 2, 8.
213
Id. at § 17 cmt. 5.
214
See id. at prefatory note.
215
Id.
216
See JOHN COOLEY, THE ARBITRATORS HANDBOOK: REVISED 435 (2009)
(“This growth in arbitration caused the Conference to appoint a Drafting Com-
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provide “state legislatures with a more up-to-date statute to resolve
disputes through arbitration.”217 The RUAA has been adopted by
twenty-one states including D.C., and was introduced in two other
states in 2020.218
In the summer of 2000, when the RUAA was enacted, the
Fourth Circuit had already issued COMSAT, which limited the arbitrator’s power to issue subpoenas to non-parties to produce materials prior to the arbitration hearing.219 This holding contradicted
three federal district court opinions that had enforced arbitral subpoenas for prehearing discovery.220 The language stated,
“[b]ecause of the unclear case law, Section 17(d) specifically states
that arbitrators have subpoena authority for discovery matters under the RUAA.”221
While COMSAT was issued before the RUAA was approved,
other circuits had not directly addressed Section 7.222 Since then, as
discussed above, a majority position has emerged among the circuits interpreting Section 7 as requiring a non-party’s “physical”
presence before the arbitrator or precluding pre-hearing discovery.223
2.
ARBITRAL INSTITUTIONS
Notwithstanding the majority of circuits implying a “physical
presence” into the language of Section 7, arbitration institutions
have long permitted the use, and seen the value, of virtual technolmittee to consider revising the Act in light of the increasing use of arbitration,
the greater complexity in many disputes resolved in arbitration and the development of the law in this area.”).
217
UNIF. ARB. ACT. pmbl.
218
2000 Arbitration Act – Enactment Map, UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=
a0ad71d6-085f-4648-857a-e9e893ae2736 (last visited May 15, 2021).
219
See supra Part II.A.
220
See UNIF. ARB. ACT § 17 cmt. 6; Amgen, Inc. v. Kidney Ctr. of Delaware
County, 879 F. Supp. 878 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Meadows Indemnity Co. v. Nutmeg
Ins. Co., 157 F.R.D. 42 (M.D. Tenn. 1994); Stanton v. Paine Webber Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., 685 F. Supp. 1241 (S.D. Fla. 1988).
221
See UNIF. ARB. ACT § 17 cmt. 6.
222
See discussion supra Part II.
223
See supra Parts II & III (discussing opinions issued by Fourth, Third,
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
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ogies in arbitration proceedings.224 And, with the increasing use of
remote technologies during the COVID-19 pandemic, some institutions have provided additional guidelines.225 FINRA, for example,
has noted how “COVID 19 has increased the demand for virtual
arbitration and mediation hearings to ensure that cases can proceed
without lengthy delays.”226 Consequently, FINRA issued a Resource Guide to help arbitrators conduct effective virtual arbitration hearings via the Zoom platform.227 The guide encourages arbitrators to be mindful of issues of fairness and impartiality by, inter
alia, allowing parties to present evidence and testimony, including
direct and cross-examination of witnesses, and to postpone the virtual hearing until further notice if the arbitration panel believes the
virtual hearing will result in unfairness to any party.228
The American Arbitration Association International Centre for
Dispute Resolution has provided similar guidance with its Virtual
Hearing Guide for Arbitrators and Parties, Model Order and Procedures for a Virtual Hearing via Videoconference (“Model Order”), and Virtual Hearing Guide for Arbitrators and Parties Utilizing Zoom.229 Interestingly, the Model Order allows for the parties,
by agreement or order of the arbitrator (if no agreement by the parties), to deem the hearing as having taken place “in the locale of
the arbitration.”230 It also adds language addressing any objections
224

Id.; Virtual Hearings, supra note 208 (stressing that “[v]irtual hearings
are not a new concept” and have been an “option to parties for years”).
225
See Tamimi, supra note 194 (“In the face of the ever-increasing restrictions on the movement of people and institutional shutdowns in Spring
2020, arbitration practitioners demonstrated the resilience and flexibility of international arbitration by continuing to resolve disputes remotely with the assistance of various technological means.”).
226
Arbitrator Resource Guide for Virtual Hearings, FINRA,
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-mediation/case-guidance-resources/arbitratorresource-guide-virtual-hearings (last visited May 15, 2021).
227
Id. (“FINRA Dispute Resolution Services is providing the Resource
Guide to help arbitrators conduct effective virtual arbitration hearings via the
Zoom platform.”).
228
Id.
229
Virtual Hearings, supra note 208.
230
AA-ICDR Model Order and Procedures for a Virtual Hearing via Videoconference, AM. ARB. ASS’N 1, 1 [hereinafter AA-ICDR Model Order],
https://go.adr.org/rs/294-SFS-516/images/AAA270_AAA-ICDR%20Model%
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to the virtual forum by noting the exigencies of the pandemic and
that “videoconference is a reasonable alternative to an in-person
hearing.”231 There is also guidance on witnesses appearing and
presenting evidence virtually.232

20Order%20and%20Procedures%20for%20a%20Virtual%20Hearing%20via%2
0Videoconference.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021). The Model Order states:
1a. Agreement to Videoconference: [if it’s been agreed to]
A. The parties and the panel/arbitrator agree that the hearing in this case will be conducted via [Platform Name]
videoconference. This confirms that the hearing will be
deemed to have taken place in [locale/place of arbitration].
B. The parties acknowledge that they have made their
own investigation as to the suitability and adequacy of
[Platform Name] for its proposed use for the video conferenced hearing and of any risks of using [Platform
Name], including any risks regarding its security, privacy
or confidentiality, and they agree to use [Platform Name]
for the hearing.
[or]
1b. Order for Videoconference Hearing: [if ordered by the arbitrator/panel and not agreed to by all parties]
A. The arbitrator/panel hereby orders that the hearing in
this case be conducted via [Platform Name]
videoconference in accordance with the procedures set
forth below. This confirms that the hearing will be
deemed to have taken place in [locale/place of arbitration].
B.
The
arbitrator/panel
notes
the
[claimant’s/respondent’s/other parties’] objections to holding
the hearing via [Platform Name]. The arbitrator/panel
finds, however, that conducting the hearing via videoconference is a reasonable alternative to an in-person hearing
in light of the COVID-19 pandemic, stay-at-home orders,
and travel limitations. Videoconferencing technology will
provide the parties a fair and reasonable opportunity to
present their case and will allow the hearing to move forward on the dates previously scheduled instead of postponing the hearing to a future date.
Id.
231
Id.
232
Id.
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Thus, the arbitration community has adapted to the modern realities of arbitration––a reality that is very different from 1925
when the FAA was enacted.233 By applying a textual approach to
conclude that Section 7 requires only an adjudicative presence and
permits pre-hearing discovery, courts may remain true to the text
of the FAA while accommodating procedures that will avoid unnecessary delay and expense, while simultaneously providing a
fair, efficient, and expeditious means for the final resolution of the
parties’ dispute.234 This is not an absurd result.
V.

IMPLICATIONS FOR SECTION 7 DURING AND AFTER COVID19
If another circuit is faced with a similar challenge in the postCOVID era, how will it be presented to the court? Perhaps a case
will arise where an arbitrator issues a summons pursuant to Section
17(d) of a state-enacted version of RUAA for a prehearing discov233

Other dispute resolution institutions have similar measures in place or
provide similar support for virtual hearings. See, e.g., ICC Virtual Hearings,
INT’L CHAMBER =COM., https://iccwbo.org/dispute-resolution-services/hearingcentre/icc-virtual-hearings/ (last visited May 15, 2021); Virtual Hearings, INT’L
CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT INV. DISPUTES, https://icsid.worldbank.org/
services/hearing-facilities/virtual-hearings (last visited May 15, 2021); LCIA
Arbitration Rules, LONDON CTR. INT’L. ARB. https://www.lcia.org/
Dispute_Resolution_Services/lcia-arbitration-rules-2020.aspx#Article%2014
(“[A] hearing may take place in person, or virtually by conference call, videoconference or using other communications technology with participants in one
or more geographical places (or in a combined form).”); HKIAC Guidelines for
Virtual Hearings, HONG KONG INT’L ARB, CTR., https://www.hkiac.org/
sites/default/files/ck_filebrowser/HKIAC%20Guidelines%20for%20Virtual%20
Hearings_3.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021); Press Release, Seoul Protocol on
Video Conference in International Arbitration is Released, KCAB INT’L (Mar.
18, 2020), http://www.kcabinternational.or.kr/user/
Board/comm_notice_view.do?BBS_NO=548&BD_NO=169&CURRENT_ME
NU_CODE=MENU0025&TOP_MENU_CODE=MENU0024pdf (last visited
May 15, 2021); Guidance Note on Remote Dispute Resolution Proceedings,
CHARTERED INST. ARB., https://www.ciarb.org/media/9013/remote-hearingsguidance-note_final_140420.pdf (last visited May 15, 2021).
234
See AA-ICDR Model Order, supra note 230 (referencing the reality that
Section 7 allows for technology use in arbitration based on the party’s circumstances and needs).
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ery deposition and it is challenged on the ground that such procedure conflicts with the majority holdings of the federal circuits regarding use of Section 7 of the FAA for prehearing evidence.
Would the court hold that FAA Section 7 preempts RUAA Section
17(d)?235 Is the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Managed Care more
likely to arise in the context of a challenge to compulsory use of
video technology to conduct a final arbitral hearing?236 Predicting
how the issue first presents itself may be unwise, but hopefully, the
alternative textual analysis performed in this Article will help inform the court’s analysis.
In fairness, prior to March 1, 2020, nobody forced to analyze
the propriety of using remote technology for various aspects of
dispute resolution, either as a part of the justice system or alternative dispute resolution systems, could have anticipated the impact
COVID-19 would have on the willingness of participants in the
legal process to convert to video technology for the conduct of
many, if not all, of its most essential processes.237 Restrictions related to the COVID-19 pandemic have imposed limitations that
prevent or severely limit people from appearing “in the physical
presence of” other people—particularly indoors.238 It is highly unlikely that Congress in 1925, having survived the 1918 Influenza

235

Preemption issues relating to the FAA are massively complicated and
beyond the scope of this Article, but it is certainly conceivable that the issue
might arise in such a setting. See, e.g., Christopher Drahozal, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 393 (2004).
236
As of the date of submission of this Article, the author is aware of only
one U.S. case involving a challenge to compulsory conduct of an arbitration
hearing by video technology. See Legaspy v. Fin. Indus. Regul. Auth., Inc., No.
20-cv-4700, 2020 WL 4696818, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 12, 2020) (denying preliminary injunctive relief sought by a party objecting to the conduct of a FINRA
arbitration via Zoom).
237
See Tamimi, supra note 194 (“However as a result of the necessity
brought about by the sudden resurgence of the COVID-19, it should come as no
surprise to the arbitral community that the utilization of technology at all levels
of the international arbitration system has rocketed in the past few months.”).
238
See Protect Yourself & Others, supra note 128 (recommending at least
six feet of distance between individuals and that persons avoid crowds and poorly ventilated indoor spaces).
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pandemic,239 used language that was intended to restrict arbitrators
acting under Section 7 of the FAA from adopting procedures to
protect the health of citizens summoned to appear and provide evidence relevant to the disputes entrusted to them, even at the risk of
exposure to the flu or other communicable diseases. However, in
practice, Managed Care may have such an unintended consequence.240 And if a party to an arbitration, or a non-party witness,
refuses to be physically present with at least one of the arbitrators,
a Section 7 summons is likely unenforceable.241
This is not hypothetical. Arbitral tribunals have faced the issue
throughout 2020242 and will continue to face it as long as the pandemic continues. When arbitrators issue summonses to non-party
witnesses, at least one of the arbitrators must be prepared to invite
the witness to appear in-person.243 The arbitrator, therefore, must
take steps to insure against transmission of COVID-19—to the
extent possible, and must comply with any government-mandated
procedures, such as installation of plexiglass shields between the
witness and the arbitrator.244 If the witness reasonably insists that
239

1918 Pandemic (H1N1 virus), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic-resources/1918-pandemich1n1.html (last updated Mar. 20, 2019).
240
See Managed Care Advisory Grp., LLC v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 939
F.3d 1145, 1158 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he district court for the district in which
the arbitrators are sitting may compel the attendance of a person refusing to
obey an arbitral summons.”). Also, in the case the court noted that the inconvenience of traveling across state lines was not sufficient to rise to the level of “constitutional concern.” Id.
241
Id. at 1161 (“The district court abused its discretion in enforcing the arbitral summons because the court lacked power under Section 7 to order the witness to appear at the video conference and provide pre-hearing discovery.”).
242
See Tamimi, supra note 194 (noting that, because of COVID-19, “in order to ensure the legitimacy of the arbitral process and the subsequent successful
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards, it is essential to ascertain the
basis on which the use of technology in international arbitration . . . may be
permitted.”).
243
See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1161 (holding that summonsed witness
testimony and documents must be presented in the physical presence of arbitrators).
244
See UNIF. ARB. ACT § 15 (“An arbitrator may conduct an arbitration in
such manner as the arbitrator considers appropriate for a fair and expeditious
disposition of the proceeding.”). Circumstances of what is fair during COVID-
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the arbitrator be in one office and the witness in a separate conference room, with the other arbitrators and counsel all attending by
Zoom connections, would that comply with the requirement that
the witness be “in the physical presence of” the arbitrator?245
Hopefully, most parties and witnesses are agreeing to permit such
examinations by video link so that parties and arbitrators are not
faced with the decision to postpone hearings or forego relevant
evidence.
In practice, Section 7 presents numerous potential scenarios for
attempting to obtain evidence from non-parties to an arbitration
governed by the FAA. In light of the circuit split, even in the absence of the technology issue, these potential scenarios will continue to challenge counsel and arbitrators. Managed Care complicates the problem for counsel and arbitrators within the Eleventh
Circuit attempting to use video technology to efficiently process
arbitration disputes entrusted to them.246 There are many potential
scenarios in which arbitrators seek evidence from non-parties, and
the cases sometimes blur them. These scenarios may include:
1. Summons for documents only seeking pre-hearing production outside the presence of the arbitrators or at least one of them.
This summons would be unenforceable under the textual analysis
of the majority of circuits to have examined Section 7.247

19 likely involves plexiglass and other preventive measures. See Manufacturing
Workers and Employers, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/guidancemanufacturing-workers-employers.html (suggesting the “[u]se of physical barriers, such as strip curtains, plexiglass or similar materials, or other impermeable
dividers or partitions to separate” individuals) (last updated Apr. 16, 2021).
245
See NYCB White Paper, supra note 186 at 15, 29 (stating “it is not inevitable that the physical presence of the arbitrator and the witness in the same
place is necessary,” and that “[e]lectronic presence of the arbitrator is an adequate substitute for physical presence, because the arbitrator could lawfully
attend in person.”).
246
See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1161 (“Accordingly, we interpret the
plain meaning of Section 7 as (1) requiring summonsed non-parties to appear in
the physical presence of the arbitrator as opposed to a video conference or teleconference; and (2) prohibiting pre-hearing discovery.”).
247
See supra Parts II & III (discussing opinions issued by Fourth, Third,
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
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2. Summons for documents only seeking pre-hearing production in the physical presence of the arbitrators or at least one of
them. This was close, but not quite the fact pattern addressed by
Judge Chertoff’s concurring opinion in Hay Group.248
3. Summons for documents only seeking pre-hearing production through electronic means outside presence of the arbitrators or
at least one of them. As the law now stands, this scenario, too, is
likely to result in an unenforceable summons in a majority of circuits.249
4. Summons for documents only seeking production in the
presence of the arbitrators at a final hearing. If the summonsed
non-party is not appearing as a witness, this summons may face
challenges under existing case law.250
5. Summons for documents only seeking production by video
link with the arbitrators on video only. This fact pattern was not
presented in any reported decision reviewed for this Article. It is
covered by the NYCB White Paper251 and the Alternative Textual
Analysis performed in Part IV of this Article.252 It would be permitted under both.
6. Summons for documents and witness seeking pre-hearing
production outside presence of the arbitrators or at least one of

248

See Hay Grp., Inc. v. E.B.S. Acquisition Corp., 360 F.3d 404, 413–14 (3d
Cir. 2004) (Chertoff, J., concurring).
249
See supra Parts II & III (discussing opinions issued by Fourth, Third,
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
250
See Hay Grp., 360 F.3d at 407 (“[T]he use of the word ‘and’ makes it
clear that a non-party may be compelled ‘to bring’ items ‘with him’ only when
the non-party is summoned ‘to attend before [the arbitrator] as a witness.’”);
Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 549 F.3d 210, 216
(2d Cir. 2008) (“The language of section 7 is straightforward and unambiguous.
Documents are only discoverable in arbitration when brought before arbitrators
by a testifying witness.”); Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1159–60 (“[T]he FAA
implicitly withholds the power to compel documents from non-parties without
summoning the non-party to testify. And if Congress intended the arbitrators to
have the broader power to compel documents from non-parties without summoning the non-party to testify, it could have said so.”).
251
Supra note 186 and accompanying text.
252
Supra Part IV.
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them. This summons is susceptible to challenges under cases reviewed in this Article.253
7. Summons for documents and witness seeking pre-hearing
production in physical presence of the arbitrators or at least one of
them. This is the recommended procedure set forth in Judge
Chertoff’s concurrence in Hay Group.254
8. Summons for documents and witness seeking pre-hearing
video link with the arbitrators or at least one of them on the video.
The Eleventh Circuit, in Managed Care, is the only circuit that has
specifically addressed the use of video technology. The Eleventh
Circuit prohibits non-party witnesses from appearing via video
conference and, instead, requires the physical presence of arbitrators.255 The Alternative Textual Analysis performed in Part IV of
this Article would permit this scenario.256
9. Summons for documents and witness seeking production in
presence of the arbitrators at the hearing. This is the only enforceable summons under Section 7 as interpreted by the Managed Care
court.257 At present, unless parties and non-party witnesses waive
their objections, this is the only available avenue for obtaining
non-party evidence in arbitrations conducted in the Eleventh Circuit.
10. Summons for documents and witness seeking production at
hearing by video link with the arbitrators and all parties on video.
As arbitrations continue during the pandemic and produce
awards that are subject to enforcement and vacatur proceedings, it
seems likely that some of them will include compulsory summonses to third parties and may present opportunities for courts to review the use of video technology under Section 7 as well as challenges to use of such technology more generally. The Alternative
Textual Analysis performed in Part IV of this Article would permit
enforcement of such a summons.

253

See supra Parts II & III (discussing opinions issued by Fourth, Third,
Second, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits).
254
See id. at 413–14 (Chertoff, J., concurring).
255
See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1159–61.
256
Supra Part IV.
257
See Managed Care, 939 F.3d at 1161.
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No single case can present a court with all or even a significant
number of the scenarios outlined above. Hopefully, future courts
will consider the multiple ways Section 7 is utilized as they face
whatever fact pattern is presented to them.
CONCLUSION
The issues presented by the circuit split and the Managed Care
decision will likely present themselves to other circuits and eventually to the Supreme Court in the not-too-distant future.258 When
they do, the courts should take a broad look at how Section 7 is
utilized by counsel and arbitrators. This Article has suggested an
alternative textual analysis utilizing multiple dictionaries from the
1920s that a court might consider.259 Whatever approach the courts
take in resolving the circuit split, this Article strongly suggests that
Section 7 not be interpreted in a fashion that prohibits compulsory
use of video technology to obtain evidence in arbitrations governed
by the FAA.260

258
259
260

See discussion supra Parts II & III.
See discussion supra Part IV.
See discussion supra Part V.

